October 23, 2019

Notes for Week 9

I.   Overview of Sellars so far:

4 rich, potentially transformative essays (SRLG, IM, EPM, CDCM), in 6 years (1951-1957). Addressing quite different subfields of philosophy, they interdigitate to give a wholly new, systematic way of thinking aobut fundamental issues.

1.   A new fundamental idea in *pragmatics* **: SRLG**. Distinction between language entry transitions and language-language moves. Seems basic, but…
2.   A new fundamental idea in *semantics***: IM**. Inferential roles, rather than extensions (to begin with).
3.   **On the basis of those *two* moves**, a new fundamental idea in *epistemology*. **EPM I**. Language-entry transitions, hence what is distinctive of noninferential reports, are not *semantically* autonomous (they need inference) because not *pragmatically* autonomous (need language-language moves). This *semantic* non-autonomy precludes them from playing a certain kind of traditional *epistemological foundational* role. But a sanitized, hygienic form of foundationalism, codifying what was right about this strand of empiricism, remains.
4.   Adding a fundamental idea in *philosophy of science*. **EPM II**. Realism vs. instrumentalism about *theoretical entities*, makes possible a new idea in *philosophy of mind*: a new kind of *behaviorism*: **methodological behaviorism**.

        This all was not particularly *Kantian*. He was transposing *empiricism* into a *pragmatist, naturalist* key. If anything, it is Hegelian. It is later Wittgensteinian, but with a systematic, theoretical inflection. It is what he thinks we can keep of Carnapian empiricism. (Compare: Quine, who was undertaking the same general enterprise, also from a perspective that was *semantically holist*, and looked to the *pragmatics*, the *use* of language, to undercut the language/theory distinction. So: *pragmatist*, in the way I, following Rorty, want to use the term.)
        The next idea, though, *is* Kantian. It is the idea of <u>pure concepts of the understanding</u>, now interpreted through Carnap's brilliant exploitation of the idea that some apparently object-language expressions are covertly *metalinguistic*.

5.   A *pragmatic expressivist* approach to *alethic modal* **discourse (in CDCM)**, building on:
   a) The **inferential semantics** of OED vocabulary (what is required for *describing* vs. *labeling*).
   b) **Kant**'s idea of the distinctive expressive role of framework-explicating concepts, and that modal concepts are among them.
   c) **Carnap**'s idea of covertly metalinguistic expressions.

The result is a conception of modal locutions, in the form of subjunctive conditionals, as codifying material rules of inference, hence as being *semantogenic*. They articulate the conceptual contents of OED vocabulary. They are accordingly the form of *semantic self-consciousness*.

(Note that he misses an opportunity here: to reconstrue *logical* vocabulary as playing this role—even though his inspiration is the *Tractatus*'s treatment of logical vocabulary as playing a distinctive *nondescriptive* expressive role. He misses the idea that *subjunctively robust* conditionals are basic *logical* vocabulary.)

6.   WS's **diagnosis in CDCM of empiricist "nothing-but-ism"** in all its forms as the result of *two* strands of thought:

   i)   **Global descriptivism**.
   ii)   **Epistemological recoil from abstracta**, from properties (universals) and propositions.

(If he is looking over his shoulder at Quine and Goodman, he is certainly right. But does his diagnosis of these two forms of puritanism going hand-in-hand get at something deeper?) Here in the *fifth* movement of his symphony (the three papers on nominalism and abstracta), he thinks once again that Carnap's *metalinguistic turn* provides the key to domesticating the *use* of expressions that *apparently* (taken at face-value as object-language *descriptive* phrases) seem to refer to ontologically extravagant and epistemologically inaccessible *abstracta*.

      I suppose that the connection between these two strands is this:

If **one understands all the expressions addressed by "nothing-but-ism" as *descriptions* in the *object language* (this is the fundamental mistake), *then* one will understand them as descriptions *of* ontologically extravagant *because* epistemically inaccessible**, *queer* (Mackie) **kinds of things**. The right response is not "nothing-but-ism"—that is, *either* reduce them to (logical constructions from) ground-level empirical descriptions, *or* exile them from perspicuous reconstructive languages and empirically respectable discourse (or perhaps, less radically, "relegate them to second-class status"). Here again, he is thinking of the wrangles of the Vienna Circle over *which* of these to do, and of Ayer on the British side of analytic philosophy. The right response is to give up the twin commitments to descriptivism and to reading these expressions as belonging to the object language. That is *non-descriptivism* (rejecting *global* descriptivism) in the specific form of *metalinguistic expressivism*.

      Modal vocabulary is Sellars's first test-case for this *constructive* (not merely *critical*) strategy.

      Note that **Wittgenstein** is also against global descriptivism (and "nothing-but-ism"), but does *not* develop a *metalinguistic* alternative. Instead he is just an ***expressive pluralist***—and *therefore* (*he* thinks it follows) a *semantic nihilist*. Language has *many* functions. Sellars here is a kind of *linguistic **dualist***. There is ground-level OED vocabulary and its use, and there are different varieties of *metalinguistic* expressions (mostly in *pragmatic* metavocabularies, but he doesn't really put that together). Cf. "The language of modality is a transposed language of norms."

II.   Opening on modality:

TwenCen up to Quine: empiricist epistemological skepticism about modality. Naturalism fights empiricism. VC.
This was one of the main distinctions Peirce claimed for his pragmatism: its emphasis on *habits* could explain dispositions and dispositional facts. C.I. Lewis followed up on this.

How surprised denizens of this world would be at what came next:
Kripkean revolution. The 4-phases of the modal revolution:
  i)   Kripke's semantics for modal *logical* vocabulary.
  ii)   Montague, Kaplan, Stalnaker, and Lewis extending it to full-blown intensional semantics.
  iii)   Kripke's application of PW framework to philosophy of language, in particular, proper names.
  iv)   Here two different strands:
          a) Lewis's picking up the *metaphysical* implications of Kripke's *semantic* analysis. The result is contemporary analytic metaphysics.
          b) The use of alethic modal vocabulary to do semantics, using dispositions and counterfactuals. This includes
              α) the teleosemantics of Millikan, Papineau, and Sterelny, on the one hand, and
              β) the informational theory of Dretske and the "one-way counterfactual dependence" of Fodor.

Rortyan response: fashion, staleness,
Why PW formalism didn't resove issues.
Q: So what did?
A: Should be: what Sellars made of Kant's notion of categories, via reading of Carnap as metalinguistic neo-Kantian.

III.   Modal Expressivism (ME):

Sellars's development of Kant's idea of pure concepts of the understanding is articulated by two master ideas.
First, his successor metaconception comprises concepts that are in some broad sense *metalinguistic*. This is the idea he got from Carnap.
The second strand guiding Sellars's reconceptualization of Kantian categories is his *semantic inferentialist* approach to understanding the contents of descriptive concepts.

Argument for *pragmatic metalinguistic expressivism* about the *use* of alethic modal expressions:
  1. Description, as opposed to mere labeling, requires situation in a space of implications.
  2. The implications involved are subjunctively robust.

3. These are what are appealed to in explanation, which is why description and explanation "go hand in hand."
4. The distinctive expressive job of modal vocabulary is to make explicit those subjunctively robust inferential connections: the ones that underwrite explanations of the applicability (or nonapplicability) of some descriptive vocabulary in terms of the (non)applicability of others.
5. So use of modal vocabulary is *explicative of* (X) something implicit in the use of OED vocabulary.
6. And use of modal vocabulary can be *elaborated from* (L) the ability to use OED vocabulary.

This last is the "**Kant-Sellars thesis about modality**":
a) in being able to use non-modal, empirical-descriptive vocabulary, one already knows how to do everything one needs to know how to do in order to deploy modal vocabulary,
b) *because* these modal locutions play the **pragmatic metalinguistic expressive role of making explicit structural features**—letting us *say* what they are—that are always already **implicit in what one *does* in using OED vocabulary in describing or representing objective empirical states of affairs**.

Pragmatic Expressivism: Saying what one is *doing* in making modal claims.
Complex relations between that and what one is *saying* in making those claims.
Does giving a *pragmatic expressivist* account, in a *pragmatic* metavocabulary, of what one is *doing* in using modal vocabulary preclude giving any and all kinds of *descriptive* or *representational* account of what one is *saying* by using modal vocabulary?
We want to investigate the relations between these.

But there are strong reasons to be *modal realists*, too.
(For instance, *naturalism* is such a reason.)

IV.   Modal Realism (MR):

By "modal realism" I mean the conjunction of the claims that:
   MR1) Some modally qualified claims are *true*.
   MR2) Those that are state *facts*.
   MR3) Some of those facts are *objective*, in the sense that they are independent of the activities of concept-users: they would be facts even if there never were or never had been concept-users.

V.   Relations between ME and MR:

Modal expressivism (ME) makes claims about what one is *doing* in using modal concepts, while modal realism (MR) makes claims about what one is *saying* by using modal concepts. ME says

that what one is doing when one makes a modal claim is endorsing an inference relating descriptive concepts as subjunctively (including counterfactually) robust, or treating two descriptive concepts as incompatible. MR says that when one does that, one is claiming *that* possession or exhibition of one empirical property is a consequence of, or is incompatible with, possession or exhibition of another. The claim that ME and MR are compatible is the claim that one can *both* be *doing* what ME says one is doing in applying modal vocabulary *and* be *saying* what MR says one is saying by doing that.

According to this way of understanding the relations between ME and MR, the claims of modal expressivism are made in a *pragmatic* metavocabulary for modal vocabulary: that is, a vocabulary suitable for specifying the practices, abilities, and performances that make up the *use* of modal vocabulary. And the claims of modal realism are made in a *semantic* metavocabulary for modal vocabulary: that is, a vocabulary suitable for specifying the *meanings* or conceptual *contents* expressed by modal vocabulary.
Reconciling these claims requires specifying a sense of "describing" or "empirical fact-stating" that is broader than that applicable to the primary use of OED vocabulary, but still sufficiently akin to it that the broader sense applicable to modal claims and the narrower sense applicable show up as species of a recognizably descriptive, representational genus. But if, once we have appreciated the pragmatic expressive role distinctive of modal vocabulary (and later ontological and normative vocabularies) we want to explore the possibility that such vocabulary *also* plays a descriptive, fact-stating, or representational role—that in addition to what one is *doing* by *saying* something using modal vocabulary, one is also *saying* something in a sense that belongs in some (large) box with what OED vocabulary lets us say (namely, *that* things are thus-and-so), then we *must* look more closely at how OED vocabulary works.

So let's do what expressivists typically do *not* do: look closely at the descriptiveness of descriptive vocabulary, the fact-statingness of fact-stating vocabulary, and the representational dimension of both.

      VI.   <u>Describing for OED vocabulary</u>:

1.   Sellars's account of what more describing requires over mere labeling or classifying (reliably producing a *response* of a certain repeatable *kind* differentially to *stimuli,* which are accordingly practically assimilated)—namely, "location in a space of (subjucntively robust material) implications—makes a clear and important distinction.

But **if it is taken as providing not only *necessary* conditions for description (all he claims), but a *sufficient* condition, what it underwrites is *declarativism* about the concept of description.** This is the view that anything that can be used as a declarative sentence counts thereby as being used descriptively.

      The "iron triangle of discursiveness" relates:
  a) *Declarative sentences*, on the side of *syntax*, or vocabulary kinds,
  b) *Asserting*, on the side of *pragmatics*, or use of vocabulary, and
  c) *Propositions*, on the side of *semantics*, or the *content* expressed by using vocabulary.

(The sense of "proposition" in the last claim is just whatever can play the role both of *premise* and of *conclusion* in relations of *implication*.)

2.   Asserting in this declarativist sense is *one* sense of "fact-stating."
And propositions in this sense, when *true*, are *facts*, in *one* sense of "fact."
For being descriptive or fact-stating in *this* inferential-declarative sense is sufficient for
>   α) **embedding as antecedent of conditionals and**
>   β) **embedding in propositional attitude ascriptions**.

This is what is required to respond to the Frege-Geach objection to expressivist analyses, which triggered the move from first-wave to second-wave expressivisms in metaethics.

But the declarativism criterion of descriptiveness includes normative statements about what one ought to do, or is permitted or obliged to do.
In *this* sense, metalinguistic statements, and even some prescriptions, *are* descriptive.
And certainly, modal statements are.
So it is too broad to be the sense Sellars is implicitly invoking in *denying* a descriptive role for alethic modal vocabulary.

Reconciling these claims requires specifying an intermediate, "Goldilocks" sense of "describing" or "empirical fact-stating" that is at once narrower than the *declarativist* sense and broader than that applicable to the primary use of OED vocabulary (to acknowledge the fact that no vocabulary stands to the OED vocabulary in the sort of metalinguistic relation that modal vocabulary stands in to OED vocabulary), but still sufficiently akin to it that the broader sense applicable to modal claims and the narrower sense applicable show up as species of a recognizably descriptive genus.

It must be *between* the very broad declarativist conception and the very narrow conception that applies to ground level OED vocabulary, which has no metalinguistic function.

3.   I want to suggest that we get such a "Goldilocks," intermediate conception of <u>describing</u>, something narrower, and define an interesting and useful line around a sense of "description," if we ***add* to the "location in a space of subjunctively robust material implications" criterion**, two more:
>   i.   (ET) **Epistemic tracking of objective facts by normative statuses**, and
>   ii. (SG) **Semantic government of normative statuses by objective facts**.

(i) is an objective dispositional-nomological matter, of the sort made explicit by subjunctive conditionals and other alethic modal locutions.
(ii) is a normative matter, of the sort made explicit by the use of deontic normative vocabulary.

4.   A key claim is that **the two dimensions of (alethic) modal epistemic tracking and deontic normative semantic government are different, and equally essential**. They do different jobs, and cannot substitute for one another.

6

5.   *Epistemic tracking* is reliable, subjunctively robust, covariance:

If the items described *were* different, the describing of them *would be* different.

It is a matter of the subjunctive and counterfactual robustness of the conceptual content correspondence between facts and claims. The tracking condition holds just insofar as the subjunctive conditional "If the fact were (or had been) different, the claiming would be (or would have been) correspondingly different," is true. Insofar as this condition holds, there is a *reliable* correspondence between the contents of facts and the contents of claimings. That is to say that the inference from a claim about the content of a claiming to the content of the corresponding fact is in general a good one.

This is what Fodor and Dretske and the teleosemanticists want to appeal to (in a more sophisticated form by the teleosemanticists) to do *all* the semantic work.

But it suffers from two drawbacks:

a) Vertically, it has trouble picking out *distal* elements of the causal chain of reliably covarying events relating what is described or represented to the act of describing or representing.

b) Horizontally, it suffers from *disjunctivitis*. If I am disposed to respond to echidnas as well as porcupines with the term "porcupine," do I really mean "porcupine or echidna"? And what if my responses are too narrow, in that I only recognize adult porcupines, or ones seen in daylight?

Re (a): The respond to the first issue, of identifying distal stimuli, is properly responded to by Dretskean (and Davidsonian) "*triangulation*." They think of this as appealing to the *intersection* of *two* causal chains of reliably covarying events.

Really, I claim, the desired result is secured by looking at the *implications*, downstream.

That is what determines that one is reporting rabbits, and not rabbit flies, even if one is immediately responding to the presence of rabbit flies, which reliably indicate the presence of rabbits.

- For locating a **distal stimulus**, the short answer is Dretske's: triangulation. When I hear the bell, I might report that it is noon, or that the bell is ringing, or that I *hear* the bell ringing. As I might report rabbits or rabbit-flies. In the latter case, the we can ask whether it follows that the things I am reporting can fly, or have fur, or would be good to eat, or change color in the winter. Some of those are *also* things I can noninferentially report. Those CCRCEs intersect, and that is what settles what I am reporting.

- **Disjunctivitis** is that in reporting a porcupine, I might be taken to be reporting porcupines *or* echidnas, even though I have never seen one of the latter. My dispositions to issue the report "porcupine" might extend to echidnas, too. After all, I might only have happened to see *male* porcupines, and we need some way to get me to be reporting porcupines, and not just male ones (or porcupines in the 20th or 21st

centuries). But if we go with dispositions, then I am really reporting *apparent* porcupines, i.e. anything I would, even mistakenly, *call* a porcupine. Here we need a norm of correctness.

Re (b): Here we need to appeal to *semantic governance* by *norms* determining what is *correct* and *incorrect*.

6.   *Semantic governance* by *norms*:

By "semantic government" I mean that descriptive claims are subject to a distinctive kind of ought-to-be. It ought to be the case that the content of a descriptive claiming stands in a special relation, which we might as well call "correspondence," to a modal fact, which it accordingly purports to state (and in case there is such a fact, succeeds in stating). In virtue of that semantic norm, claimings are answerable for their correctness (accord with that norm) to facts.

Normative semantic government of claimings by facts says that it ought to be the case that there is a fact whose content is articulated by objective modal relations of material consequence and incompatibility that line up with the subjective (in the sense of pertaining to knowing and acting discursive subjects) normative relations of material consequence and incompatibility that articulate the content of a claiming. If that norm is not satisfied, the claiming does not live up to the standard provided by the fact it purports to state.

The notion of <u>correctness</u> involved is a distinctively *semantic* one. For it expresses the sense of "correct" in which claimings are *responsible to* the facts they in this sense count as stating, representing, or being about, for their correctness, and in which those facts are accordingly semantically *authoritative* for the claimings that purport to state, represent, or be about them.

Semantic governance expresses Kant's insight that intentionality, reference, and representation essentially include a *normative* dimension of *authority* of representings over representeds, or, equivalently, *responsibility* of representings to representeds.

RDRDs establish ET, but do not discriminate between more proximal and more distal elements of the CCRCE, *all* **of which are tracked. Inferentially mediated triangulation does that. SG appeals to the** *social* **articulation of practices of giving and asking for reasons to respond to the second consideration, in the face of "disjunctivitis" concerns that arise with ET alone.**

- **Location in a space of implications-and-incompatibilities is needed to distinguish describing in a very wide sense from labeling, because it is needed to solve the problem of picking out a distal stimulus from a CCRCE.**
- **That is required as an input to ET, to decide** *what* **I am epistemically tracking, i.e. nomologically locked to—eventually, what I am describing.**
- **SG is required to solve the problem raised by disjunctivitis, if ET is all we have to go on. It is required to specify a** *norm* **of** *assessment***. It determines what I am describing something** *as***.**

ET and SG can come apart in other ways**: I could take S to be epistemically tracking the man with gingerale in his glass, but the truth of his claims to be semantically governed by the man (whom he does not see) with champagne in his glass, in his conversation about the one *he* calls (but I know better) "the man with champagne in his glass**."

> I would **report his belief** *de re*: S believes of the man with gingerale in his glass that he is the man with champagne in his glass.
>
> I might similarly report: S believes of porcupines and echidnas that they are porcupines.

SG: Crucial examples for me of ET and SG coming apart are **speaker's reference** and **de re ascriptions** that diverge from the corresponding de dicto specifications of content. Must tell both these stories. So: man in corner with champagne vs man in corner with gingerale. inventor of lightning rod.

[So: **Explain background of speaker's ref/semantic ref and de re/de dicto as I understand them**.]

    a)   The next point is that **the norms in question for SG are fundamentally *norms of assessment*, not *norms of deliberation*—third (or second) person ought-to-bes, not first person ought-to-dos**.

    b)   As such, as I understand them, they essentially involve the distinction of social perspective between *attributing* commitments and *acknowledging* them.

- Cf. *Pragmatic* metavocabulary account of what one is *doing* in attributing *knowledge* inspired by the JTB account of what one is *saying* in doing that: namely, attributing commitment (B), attributing entitlement to the commitment (J), and *acknowledging* (undertaking) commitment oneself (T).

- Cf. *De re* **ascriptions of propositional attitudes**, and the *pragmatic* metavocabulary account of what one is *doing* in using them to say what someone is representing or thinking *about*.

- Cf. **Speaker's ref vs semantic ref**, from assessor's pt of view.

- Then ET wd seem to be captured by subjunctive conditionals having the direction of Fodor's "one-way counterfactual dependence" of 'horses' on horses [Have I got Fodor's direction right in this remark?]:

> If S *were* to report assert ⌐p⌐ , then (it is probable that) it *would* be the case that p.
> The contrapositive of this [can we assume this equivalence for the relevant sort of subjunctive conditional?] is:
> If it *were not* the case that p, S *would not* utter-assertingly ⌐p.
> That is the form I have been considering. This direction seems right, since it is by no means the case that if p then S claims that p.

    a)   MIE's "reliability inference" is now being subdivided into 4 different parts (its fine structure is being further articulated), which go together when all goes well, but can diverge when they do not.

       a) utterance correlating with stimulus,

       b). Commitment correlating with stimulus,

       c). Entitlement correlating with stimulus,

       d) attributor's acknowledgement correlating with stimulus.

## VII.   Reconciling ME and MR:

1.   **Modal vocabulary both epistemically tracks and is semantically governed by objective relations of consequence and incompatibility among items described/represented by OED vocabulary.** These relations are expressed by subjunctive conditionals relating OED vocabulary.

2.   Accordingly, modal vocabulary plays a descriptive/representational role, in the intermediate ("Goldilocks") sense defined by ET+SG.

3.   The relations of epistemic tracking of and semantic governance by facts statable (describable/representable) using OED vocabulary are induced by the composition of the expressive relations between OED vocabulary and those facts, to begin with, and the expressive relation between the *use* of OED vocabulary and what is *stated about* that use by modal vocabulary.

4.   I am committed to being able to *derive* **ET and SG from LXness, at least for alethic modal vocabulary**.
1. ET: What matters for epistemic tracking of modal facts by modal claimings is assessment of embedded subjunctive conditionals, of the form: "If it were not the case that (if a sample were pure copper, it would conduct electricity), then S would (probably) not claim that (if a sample were pure copper, it would conduct electricity).
2. SG: What matters for semantic government of modal claimings by modal facts is assessment of embedded subjunctive conditionals of the form: "If it were not the case that (if a sample were pure copper, it would conduct electricity), then it would not be *correct* to claim that (if a sample were pure copper, it would conduct electricity)."

Epistemic Tracking
and
Semantic Government
for OED and Modal Vocabularies

Claim is that the horizontal ET and SG relations at the bottom are induced by and deducible from (so in some sense are an aspect of the composition of) the vertical ET and SG relations and the horizontal LX relations.
[Challenge: Explain *exactly* how this works. Need *both* pairs of relations, vertical ET/SG and horizontal LX, to yield *both* SG/ET at bottom.]

3.   Modal Realism:

a) The overall claim is that alethic modal vocabulary is to be understood to begin with as descriptive and fact-stating in the intermediate ET+SG sense, even though it is not OED vocabulary, and so does not qualify under the most demanding standard. That is, it not only stands in relations of material consequence-and-incompatibility, but also exhibits *both* ET and SG.

b) Furthermore, the claim is that alethic modal vocabulary (and there will be a later somewhat parallel discussion for deontic normative vocabulary) stands in the ET and SG relations to modal facts constitutive of modal realism *because* and *insofar as* its stands in the relation of being LX for OED vocabulary. This is what is needed to show that we should endorse modal realism *as a consequence* of endorsing modal expressivism of the distinctive categorial variety articulated by LX-ness.

c) As a further point, (a) and (b) are both compatible with alethic modal (and, later, deontic normative) vocabulary *also* having some *observational* uses. That is, it is compatible with some paradigmatically ˢdispositionalˢ vocabulary having observational uses: "fragile," "friendly," "rigid,"….

c) On this line, the big question will be **how the fact that modal vocabulary is LX for inferential-and-incompatibility relations among OED vocabulary shows that it is both ET of and SG by consequential-and-incompatibility facts relating empirical states of affairs.**

The account of what it is for OED states of affairs to be *determinate* (=describable, and not merely labelable) in terms of their standing in relations of consequence-and-incompatibility to one another *already* requires us to be realistic about what is expressed by modal vocabulary, once we realize that it makes those relations *explicit*.

Q: Does the L part of LX matter at all for answering the question above, or is it all coming from the X part?

A: The argument for *modal realism*, in the sense of there being modal *facts*, is indeed that above, from determinateness as describability in the wider sense. What remains is to show that modal vocabulary stands to those facts in the relations of ET and SG.

So what must be shown is just that, **given that the facts in question are facts about what follows from and is incompatible with what, and the fact that modal vocabulary makes those relations explicit (X), that modal claims therefore stand in relations of ET and SG to those relations**.

More specifically, must show that the *very same process* in virtue of which OED vocabulary is ET to and SG by OED facts guarantees that modal vocabulary, making explicit the consequence-and-incompatibility relations among OED vocabulary/facts (if it works for one, it works for the other, because ETing what ETs something else is ETing that something else—but is that true for SG?) ETs and is SGd by those same relations.

And **that nothing more is required to determine the content of modal vocabulary than what is established by the process by which OED vocabulary comes to be both ET and SG by OED facts is just what the L portion of LXness ensures**.

So both halves of the LXness claim matter.

I must be clearer about the contribution each of the L and the X components of LXness makes to the fact that modal vocabulary is determined to be both ET of and SG by the consequence-and-incompatibility relations among OED facts by the very same process by which it is determined that OED vocabulary is both ET of and SG by the OED facts.

d) Argumentative strategy for ET side of use of modal vocabulary:
Claim: **The subjunctive conditionals codifying the fact that OED vocabulary ETs OED facts cannot be true unless the subjunctive conditionals codifying the ETing of objective modal relations of consequence-and-incompatibility among OED facts by subjective normative relations of consequence-and-incompatibilty among OED claimings obtain. This fact does not appeal to modal vocabulary. It regards only OED vocabulary.**
But when put together with the fact that modal vocabulary is explicative (X) of subjective-normative relations of consequence-and-incompatibility, the claim entails that claimings couched in modal vocabulary ET objective modal relations of consequence-and-incompatibility among OED facts.
(Actually, I can see telling this story so that **what needs to be added to the story about OED claimings and their relations to each other in order to substantiate the claim about modal vocabulary ETing relations among OED states of affairs is precisely the way its use is** *elaborated from* **the inf-and-inc relations among OED claimings**.
That line would retain a symmetry with (e) below, even after the emendation of its second half.

e) If (d) is successful, then the *symmetric* claim would be that the SG of modal vocabulary by objective relations of consequence-and-incompatibility among OED facts must come from the way modal vocabulary is elaborated from (L) deontic normative relations of material consequence-and-incompatibility among claimings formulated using OED vocabulary.
But this does not actually seem right.
Here we look at how assessors would assess the correctness of modal claims. What is needed is that they consult the objective relations of material consequence-and-incompatibility among OED states of affairs.
This, too, actually would seem to be a matter of the *explicative* **(X) function of modal vocabulary: If and insofar as assessors do understand modal vocabulary as playing this explicative expressive role, this is how they** *should* **understand it as SG.**

[Here is where my story gets fuzzy: I don't *really* know how to argue that the particular sort of LX-ness modal vocabulary has to OED vocabulary underwrites all of
- inferential-and-incompatibility articulation,
- ET of objective consequential-and-incompatibility relations relating OED states of affairs by modal vocabulary in the form of subjunctive conditionals of the form: S wd not assert "All As are necessarily Bs" unless if something were an A, it would be a B.
- SG of subjunctive conditionals by those same objective consequential-and-incompatibility relations relating OED states of affairs.

Concluding Lesson: the SG assessment is, functionally, a) whether, and b) under what specification, one is willing to use the other's claim as a premise in one's own reasoning. That is the connection to de re specifications of their beliefs--and de re specifications of beliefs in propositional attitude ascriptions is the home language game of representational-intentional vocabulary. This last story is the germ of an expressivist account of representational idioms (and so of intentional ones, along the representational branch).

4.   Key move is that OED vocab cannot be ET of and SG by OED states of affairs without the inferential relations of being ET of the relations of consequence and incompatibility among the possible OED states of affairs.

5.   Once again, the outstanding problem here is explaining *in detail* how the *composition* (think: category theory) of a) the ET/SG relations between OED vocabulary and the determinate objective world with b) the LX relations between modal vocab and OED vocabulary set up a *pragmatically mediated descriptive/representational* relation between modal vocabulary and the objective world. It is distinguished both from OED descriptive relations, which are not pragmatically mediated, and in that sense metalinguistic, and from those of mathematics or abstract-object talk, which have only SG and not ET relations.

    VIII.   <u>General lessons concerning expressivism:</u>

Characterization of the elements of third-wave representationalism:
a). Much wider range of vocabularies addressed: modal, normative generally, logical (only me: not LW, Carnap, Sellars, Blackburn).
b). "Metalinguistic" approach to their expressive roles.
c). Understanding sense of "metalinguistic" in terms of recursively generated hierarchy of pragmatically mediated semantic relations.
d). Understanding expressive accounts as in a pragmatic metavocabulary, and so as specifying what one is *doing* in ("making first-hand use for") using such vocabulary. This as compatible with various stories about what one is *saying* when one is doing that.
e). Hence, first problem is to understand better the relations there can be, for the various vocabularies in (a), between account of what one is doing in using them, and what one is saying thereby.